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A B S T R A C T   
Very little is known about how violent extremist practices are learned, and the role of educational channels 
through which they are spread. This empirical study extrapolates insights specific to the Bosnian and Herze-
govinian context to demonstrate how one ultraconservative ideology, Salafism, can radically alter the dominant 
thinking and behavior of ordinary individuals once they feel displaced from the mainstream institutions and 
particularly from the formal education. At the core of the displacement and replacement model of radicalization is an 
informal and tactful teacher, influencer, or a mentor that individuals connect with either online or in person. 
Using the primary data collected in Bosnia and Herzegovina through 20 in-depth and semi-structured interviews 
with radicalized persons, the study sequences a ten-step radicalization model through which the interviewees 
have transformed from ordinary citizens into radicalized actors with a potential to engage in violent extremism.   
1. Introduction 
At the core of the displacement and replacement model of radicalization 
is an informal and tactful teacher, influencer, or a mentor that in-
dividuals connect with either online or in person (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2021; 
2020a; 2020b; 2016a). Radicalization begins with a sense of displace-
ment from the mainstream institutions and particularly from the formal 
education. The mentor, in person or online, replaces institutional actors 
and other sources of knowledge to become a guide through trans-
formative and experiential learning. This replacement can turn into 
radicalizing education where extremist narratives subversively mini-
mize the relevance of formal institutions, education, and teachers. They 
are deliberately constructed outside the classrooms to appeal to disen-
franchised individuals who harbor grievances. Formal classrooms and 
institutions are replaced with personal tutorials, webinars, speeches, 
and podcasts curated by informal mentors, influencers, and recruiters 
who project blame for individual and societal problems to a targeted 
group that ultimately becomes the object of hate. This radicalization 
model warns that failures in the formal education system push students 
to look for validation elsewhere, which is where they meet radicalizing 
alternatives. 
Very little is known about how violent extremist practices are 
learned, and the role of educational channels through which they are 
spread. The model highlights the informal learning in the radicalization 
process. Here, informal learning refers to varied forms of learning 
occurring outside formal classroom and educational institutions. Both 
children and adults learn independently and even incidentally in their 
physical or virtual social environments where their knowledge acquisi-
tion is either self-guided or guided by trusted mentors, friends, col-
leagues, guides, or peers that serve as role models (Schugurensky, 2000; 
Marsick and Volpe, 1999). This model adds to the scholarship by 
introducing a novel link between mentorship, informal learning, and 
radicalization. 
Situated within the Bosnian context, the educational displacement and 
replacement model of radicalization demonstrates how the alternative and 
informal teaching, offered in person or via traditional or social media, 
can deepen a person’s sense of displacement by the formal education 
institutions and, in doing so, initiate radicalization. Using the primary 
data collected in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) via 20 in-depth and 
semi-structured interviews with radicalized persons, the study se-
quences a ten-step radicalization model through which these in-
terviewees have transformed from ordinary citizens to radicalized actors 
with a potential to engage in violent extremism. With the help of men-
tors, they have adopted Salafism as an ultraconservative ideology that 
can radically alter the dominant thinking and behavior of individuals. 
2. Background: emergence of different forms of radicalization in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Helped by Bosnian Serbs, Serbia invaded Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
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early 1992 to implement the genocide against primarily Bosnian Mus-
lims (Bosniaks), ultimately aiming to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
territory and create Greater Serbia – a racially and ethnically pure nation 
for Serbs only. Prior to the war, Radovan Karadzic, along with other 
members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, publicly declared that Serbs 
would “use the Serbian-supported war machinery to make life impos-
sible for civilians” and that “Muslims will disappear…from the face of 
the Earth” (International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, 
2004, np). In 2005, the U.S. Congress confirmed that “the Serbian pol-
icies of aggression and ethnic cleansing meet the terms defining geno-
cide”, where genocide refers to the intentional and systemic attempt to 
eradicate an ethnic, religious, or racial group (U.S. Congress Senate 
Resolution 134, 2005). 
In several of its rulings, The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia established that the Serbs’ forces committed geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes against Bosniaks in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 through 1995. During the trial of 
Serbia’s president, Slobodan Milosevic - charged with 66 counts of 
crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina as well as in other nations in the Balkans - the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (2004, np), reconfirmed its 
prior findings that the Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina committed 
genocide against Bosniaks: 
“[T]here existed a joint criminal enterprise, which included mem-
bers of the Bosnian Serb leadership, whose aim and intention was to 
destroy a part of the of Bosnian Muslim population, and that geno-
cide was in fact committed…The genocidal intent of the Bosnian 
Serb leadership can be inferred from all the evidence…The scale and 
pattern of the attacks, their intensity, the substantial number of 
Muslims killed…the detention of Muslims, their brutal treatment in 
detention centers and elsewhere, and the targeting of persons 
essential to the survival of the Muslims as a group are all factors that 
point to genocide.” 
After nearly four years of mass killings and rapes of Bosniaks, the 
Dayton Peace Accord was signed at the end of 1995, under the auspices 
of the United States and the international community. The Accord pro-
duced imperfect peace, ethnically dividing the country into two entities, 
legitimizing the effects of the genocide the Serb forces committed 
(Sabic-El-Rayess, 2009). Serbs were principally allowed to retain the 
territory they militarily captured and ethnically cleansed calling it 
Republika Srpska. Of 344,803 Bosniaks who lived in the parts of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina that Serbs subsequently cleansed of Bosnian Muslims, 
only 7933 Bosniaks remained in the Serb-dominated region 
post-genocide (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia, 2004). While at the time of the Dayton Peace Accord signing in 
late 1995, the international community did not have the full knowledge 
of the Serb leadership, police, and military’s involvement in the geno-
cide against Bosnian Muslims, the international community knew of the 
concentration camps, ethnic cleansing, and grave violations of human 
rights by the Serb forces as early as in 1992. The 1992 United Nations’ 
resolution 47/121 (United Nations, 1992) recognized that there was: 
“[T]he deterioration of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina owing to intensified aggressive acts by the Serbian and 
Montenegrin forces to acquire more territories by force, character-
ized by a consistent pattern of gross and systematic violations of 
human rights, a burgeoning refugee population resulting from mass 
expulsions of defenseless civilians from their homes and the exis-
tence in Serbian and Montenegrin controlled areas of concentration 
camps and detention centers, in pursuit of the abhorrent policy of 
“ethnic cleansing”, which is a form of genocide….” 
Later, the creator of the Dayton Peace Accord, Richard Holbrooke, 
regretted that he had given into Serbia’s then President, Slobodan 
Milosevic, demand that the Serb entity be called Republika Srpska or, in 
translation, the Serb Republic (Holbrooke, 2011; Sabic-El-Rayess, 
2016b). 
The consequent ethnic segregation split the country into two ethnic 
entities – Serbs primarily live in the Republika Srpska while Bosniaks 
and Croats reside in the other half of the country called Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Beyond 2.2 million people who were displaced, 
over 100,000 who were killed, and 50,000 women who were raped, the 
collective trauma inflicted on Bosnian Muslims was magnified by 80% of 
the country’s 1144 mosques (Ozturk, 2018) being damaged or destroyed 
to eradicate Bosniaks’ culture and history from the region. 
Serbia continues to interfere by supporting the post-war Serb lead-
ership in Bosnia in racializing Muslims as the other-ed group in the 
larger European context even after the European Court of Human Rights, 
the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia have all established that Serb forces 
committed the genocide against Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 
2019, the chief prosecutor at the UN court in The Hague, Serge Bram-
mertz, called the continued genocide denial by Serbia unacceptable: “It 
cannot be tolerated that just last week a government minister called the 
Srebrenica genocide false while a member of parliament congratulated 
Ratko Mladic for the genocide which, he said, was a brilliant military 
operation” (Stojanovic, 2019, np). In 2017, Ratko Mladic, a Bosnian 
Serb general and commander of the Bosnian Serb forces was convicted 
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia of 10 
counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (Yadav, 2021). 
The hate narrative targeting Muslims enabled genocide. Though 
cultivated by the Serb nationalists for centuries, it was magnified in 
1980 s by Slobodan Milosevic, an authoritarian and former President of 
Serbia (Sabic-El-Rayess 2022a, 2022b). Former U.S. Ambassador to 
Croatia, Peter Galbraith, a principal actor in the peace negotiations and 
humanitarian efforts in the former Yugoslavia confirmed that Slobodan 
Milosevic “was the architect of a policy of creating Greater Serbia and 
that little happened without his knowledge and involvement” (Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, 2004, p. 59). Milo-
sevic’s strategy was to create a fear inducing narrative to compel 
ordinary Serbs to take up arms and justify the killings of Muslims in 
Bosnia. While not all Serbs supported or partook in the genocide against 
Bosnian Muslims, mass radicalization of the Serb population did occur 
under the auspices of Milosevic as one of the most popular Serb na-
tionalists of the 20th century. His media machinery generated fiction-
alized stories evoking othering and hate of Muslims (Zulic, 2018) 
ultimately helping him radicalize ordinary Serbs and initiate multiple 
wars in the former Yugoslavia. 
In the Republika Srpska’s schools today, genocide denial remains 
pervasive though it was banned in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the in-
ternational community on July 28, 2021 (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2022a, 
2022b). Serbs continue to leverage Russia’s military, political, and 
economic support (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2022a, 2020; Sabic-El-Rayess, 
2020c). Bosniaks, scarred by the intergenerational trauma, feel aban-
doned by the international community and invisible to the country’s 
corrupt political gentry (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2022a, 2016c, 2014, 2013, 
2012, 2011, 2009; Sabic-El-Rayess and Heyneman, 2020; Sabi-
c-El-Rayess and Seeman, 2017; Sabic-El-Rayess and Mansur, 2016). 
Continued genocide denial, coupled with Serbs’ radicalization and 
Russia’s presence, have facilitated a reciprocal radicalization within a 
small sub-segment of Bosniaks who fear another genocide. 
In this fragile context and vacuum left by the Western powers, Iran 
and Saudi Arabia now vie for influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
study examines how Salafism, an ultraconservative sect within Islam 
that originated in the 18th century Saudi Arabia as a reformist move-
ment seeking to revive purity and piousness in Islam while repudiating 
corruption and resisting Western colonization, has emerged in Bosnia 
where Salafism did not exist prior to the war. The Bosnian setting is 
particularly interesting as Pew Research confirms that Bosnian Muslims, 
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despite being subjected to genocide, remain the most tolerant Muslims 
in the world. Throughout their long history in the region, Bosniaks have 
demonstrated their respect for and inclusion of other ethnic group 
(Sabic-El-Rayess, 2022c). Yet, in this tolerant space, Salafis were still 
able to build a following. Salafi recruiters are capable of transforming 
initially unreceptive individuals into supporters self-conforming to rigid 
ideas that were once alien to the new converts. But, how do they do it? 
The study outlines the conversion process into Salafism as based on the 
lived experiences of a small group of converts in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
3. Literature review: role of education in radicalization 
This analysis assumes education is an effort, either individual and 
collective, to acquire knowledge in schools as formal institutions (formal 
education) or in social environments where individuals experience and 
learn about the world outside the confines of educational institutions 
(informal education). The study applies the Experiential Learning Theory 
(ELT), which “affords equal status to multiple ways of knowing” (Rainey 
and Kolb, 1995, p. 131). According to Kolb (1984), learning occurs in 4 
stages: learners go through an experience; reflect on it; analyze the 
process in abstract to learn from it; and finally engage in actively 
experimenting with the new knowledge by applying it. Individuals who 
radicalize, this study finds, are often reacting to the marginalizing and 
silencing experience in schools that they or their children had, which 
ultimately forces them to seek alternative ways of knowing and sense 
making. This perspective yields a new answer to how a person radical-
izes by recognizing that the radicalizing actor has often been deprived 
from an inclusive educational experience, which plays a critical role in 
their consequent radicalization. 
As Payne (2017) argues, humans have historically and instinctually 
seen the world in relative terms, by comparing themselves and their 
standing to those around them. Another study finds that even the 
conception of poverty is not absolute but relative - school children and 
women see themselves as haves or have nots relative to their peers 
(Sabic-El-Rayess et al., 2019; Fadhil and Sabic-El-Rayess, 2020; Sabi-
c-El-Rayess, 2019). Though a practice not exclusive to the Western 
world (Sabic-El-Rayess and Joshi, 2022), the collective West has treated 
Muslims as lesser relative to self (Allen, 2010; Sayyid Vakil, 2010; 
Bayraklı and Hafez, 2016), and Muslims recognize and experience that 
inferior position in educational and other contexts (Sabic-El-Rayess, 
2022a), which shapes their coping mechanisms and their own informal 
learning. Cockcroft (2012, 83) notes that Islam began as a reformative 
movement aimed at purifying government to ensure “[m]orality was not 
only a question of ethics but also a basis of government”, making Islam 
an appealing framework for those viewing their societies and elites as 
corrupt, immoral and self-serving - a common sentiment shared by the 
educationally displaced individuals who see themselves and their com-
munities as wronged by the power holders. 
Recent literature in the field of education offers insights into the 
challenges Muslims may experience particularly in the Western envi-
ronment (Husain, 2009; Pels and de Ruyter, 2012; Revell, 2010; Espo-
sito, 1999; Panjwani, 2017) though none zooms in on the education’s 
role in the radicalization of European Muslims living in Bosnia. In the 
UK, Muslim immigrants have been studied primarily through the secu-
rity lens and within the framework of the government’s Prevent pro-
gram centered on detecting the radicalizing Muslim youth in British 
classrooms (Awan, 2012). Much of the research on the Prevent program 
has criticized the program’s stigmatization of the Muslim community; 
lacking comparable focus on the radicalizing far-right youths emerging 
throughout the UK and Europe; and excluding immigrant Muslim youths 
from the critical engagement in the classroom (Heath-Kelly, 2017). In 
the 35 OECD countries, Muslims have become a growing target of 
terrorism resulting from anti-Muslim racism (Hayden, 2017). Fear of 
Muslims is not abating even among the moderate European youths (Pels 
and de Ruyter, 2012). Muslims first learn of their peers’ rejection in 
schools as a reflection of a larger societal truth. 
For Foucault (1975), societal institutions serve to disguise certain 
truths and how power truly operates under the veil of apparent inde-
pendence and abstract principles. Foucault (1991) further argues that 
power is not only institutionally manifested but rather operates all 
around us. The analysis capitalizes on that claim to suggest how power is 
demonstrative in all that transpires through education – formal and 
informal. Formal education - through curriculum, discussions, repre-
sentations, and peer and teacher interactions - has the power to include 
or exclude, marginalize, or center. In the Western context, Muslim 
youths experience anti-Muslim racism, isolation, and marginalization 
through the curriculum (Zaal, 2012; Hossain, 2017). Even within reli-
gious education that is aimed at broadening perspectives on religion, 
students link Islam to violence (Revell, 2010). Pels and de Ruyter (2012) 
argue that preventive measures ought to include examining the quality 
of young Muslims’ socialization environments in schools given that 
radicalization occurs during the formative years when youth’s socio-
political identities are amenable to change. 
This study shows that the alternative educational narrative offered 
by Salafis fills the lacuna left by schools when they fail to evoke a sense 
of inclusion, purpose, and belonging for the marginalized and other-ed. 
As Foucault (1975), Sabic-El-Rayess and Mansur (2019) would put it, 
education helps construct certain “truth regimes” that are in constant 
flux as they shape and guide dominant narratives, social behaviors, and 
norms. What is welcomed as the prevailing view, marginalized as the 
unwanted perspective, or silenced as the unacceptable voice is 
constantly negotiated by the stakeholders in quest for power. Muslims 
cope with these tensions by disengaging when they realize they are 
operating within an educational system that is likely to target or fail 
them. Positionality of young Muslims as a uniformly stereotyped iden-
tity pushes them to internalize such categorization, only furthering their 
marginalization and isolation: a sense of rejection ultimately deepens 
their self-isolation and devotion to Islam (Moors, 2009). 
But, how exactly individuals transition from first experiencing 
marginalization within schools to radicalizing is not well understood. 
Radicalization is both a process and a destination with aversion to 
modernity, tolerance, and progress whether within Muslim or non- 
Muslim communities (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2020a). It is rigid in thought 
and behavior, and terrorism is a violent expression of the individual or 
group’s grievances morally justified by the radicalized beliefs. 
Pels and de Ruyter, (2012) have shown that teachers tend to other 
Muslims. Often, vocational schooling is considered a policy solution to 
integrating Muslims in the multiethnic European societies, but such 
approach patronizes Muslims and implicitly asserts that the Muslims’ 
functional purpose in the multiethnic and multiracial societies is 
limited. In Netherlands, the second generation Muslim immigrants who 
are trained in vocational schools tend to have greater social, economic, 
and mental health challenges than their parents, indicating the failed 
integration (Van Geel and Vedder, 2010). The vocational schools favor 
the authoritarian teaching style that precludes students from critically 
engaging with the curricular content (Pels and de Ruyter, 2012). This 
educational displacement of Muslims into these disciplined spaces pro-
duces susceptibility to radicalization. The approach positions Muslims as 
a uniformed collective with a limited potential to contribute to their 
societies. 
Obtaining a degree or achieving academic success does not equate to 
gaining a sense of belonging in a school environment. Sabic-El-Rayess 
and Laura Sullivan (2020d) chronicle a Bosnian Muslim experience of 
discrimination in the schooling system of the former Yugoslavia that can 
lead to a lacking sense of belonging and recognition despite academic 
success. The Bosniak community has suffered not only physical 
displacement, genocide, and ethnic segregation since the 1990 s, but it 
has been subjected to a multigenerational displacement from the 
educational system in the former Yugoslavia that worked to transpose 
Bosniaks, their lived experiences, and representations from the main-
stream curriculum in schools (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2022a, 2022b; 
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Sabic-El-Rayess and Laura Sullivan, 2020d). Educational displacement 
translates into being invisible in the educational curricula leaving a 
permanent imprint on those affected, in this instance, the Bosniak col-
lective. Sabic-El-Rayess argues that when there is the prevailing absence 
of representation of Muslims and curricula incorporating a Muslim 
experience, educational displacement is deepened while the Muslim 
invisibility is normalized. 
Other scholars (Hilgendorf, 2003) have argued that the denial of 
Islam as the constructive basis for education and favoring of the Western 
model of education exacerbates grievances and educational displacement 
in the Muslim world. Thus, it is not one’s affiliation with Islam that 
radicalizes youths. Religion alone neither sufficiently nor adequately 
explains why individuals radicalize. Instead, educational displacement - 
shaped by a sense of exclusion, grievances, and deprivation - sends one 
on a search for belonging during which a person can radicalize. This is 
why the study formulates a more nuanced perspective on radicalization, 
where Islam is not the primary instigator of radicalization of young 
Muslims in Bosnia but a default, almost incidental ideological option 
resorted to by the educationally and socially displaced. 
4. Methodological framework 
The analysis discusses the role of education in the radicalization 
process that Salafis deploy in Bosnia. This work is a sub-segment of a 
larger study involving 50 in-person, audio-recorded, and semi- 
structured interviews with individuals ranging from ultraconservative 
Muslims to Salafi converts with potentially violent tendencies. The 
radicalization model introduced in the upcoming section is derived 
specifically on a selected sub-set of 20 in-depth audio-recorded and 
semi-structured interviews with 16 men and 4 women who have fully 
converted into Salafism. 
It took several years to find an entry point into the self-isolating 
Salafi communities. Being a researcher with substantive experience in 
the region was critical to gaining access to those communities. The study 
was carefully crafted as the effort to understand the attitudes towards 
education, the experience of educational displacement, if any, and the 
learning process during which individuals transformed from often not 
being religious to becoming ultraconservative Salafis. This research was 
focused on understanding Salafis’ experiential, informal, and trans-
formative learning without judging or demonizing the group, making 
them open to participating in this research. 
While the vast majority of Bosnian Muslims do not endorse Salafism 
as one of the most conservative sects in Islam, the estimates suggest that 
a very small and select group does. The process started with several 
hundred Salafis who came to Bosnia as missionaries after the war, often 
financed by Saudi Arabia but unwelcomed by Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
official Islamic Community that has cultivated a 600-year old tolerant 
version of Islam authentic to the region (Rose, 2019). Today, in Bosnia, 
there are anywhere between 20,000 and 50,000 Salafis (Rose, 2019). 
While the number of the Salafi adherents is not high, in a post-war 
country of about 3.3 million people where the Muslim community has 
been traumatized by the genocide and where Salafism was unknown 
until the mid 1990 s, this Salafi emergence is worthy of scholarly 
attention given the sect’s susceptibility to extremism. 
Prior attempts by other scholars and journalists to engage in con-
versations with the Bosnian Salafis have been mostly unsuccessful given 
that this population serves as a principal recruiting ground for militant 
groups (Mulholland, 2016). Several hundreds of Bosnian Salafis are 
estimated to have joined ISIS and other militant organizations, but the 
exact numbers remain unknown. The sample for this study was collected 
nationally though there were cities, towns, and villages where dozens of 
the attempts to speak to a Salafi were unsuccessful. It was impossible to 
gain access to some of the self-isolating communities. 
Semi-structured interviews included over 100 questions, covering 
the participants’ demographic, socioeconomic, religious, and educa-
tional profiles, their views on Islam, Salafism, formal and informal 
education, information access, social norms, values, and beliefs. Audio 
recordings were analyzed for content and subtle signs of participants’ 
divergence from specific topics. Data was evaluated using content 
analysis, looking for repeated mentions of terms that have assisted 
learning and acquisition of the converts’ ultraconservative and radical 
views. No prior scholarship exists on the radicalized Salafis’ approach to 
education in Bosnia. 
Education was referred to as inclusive of both formal and informal 
knowledge production, acquisition, and transfer. But, the questions 
asked distinguished between the formal education as the dominant so-
cial institution, and the informal education in the non-institutional space 
where mentors, in person or online, influence those seeking alternatives 
to formal schooling. The interview guide engaged the interviewees with 
questions, follow up questions, and clarifications to determine their 
exact path to radicalization. 
The interviews with women took place in the presence of a male 
family member as interviews with women alone were not allowed. All 
interviews were recorded in Bosnian, encrypted, and carefully tran-
scribed, with a special focus on the trends in language, views, and paths 
towards radicalization but also on any changes in tone, mood, or aver-
sion to a specific question. For instance, there was often a sense of se-
crecy during the exchanges relating to the mentors who facilitated the 
radicalization process. When asked to share more about her mentor, a 
Salafi woman said the question “irritates me. All you need to know is 
that I am a true believer. I do not want to disclose their names. All you 
need to know is that they call for good things to be done” (TZ001). 
The study shows that Salafis have mastered a personalized 
mentorship-centered approach to spread radical ideas. The Salafi men-
tors, recruiters, or influencers played key roles in deepening the radi-
calization of the interviewed Salafis and were held in high esteem by the 
converts. Some Salafi converts were fully radicalized and intolerant of 
other Muslims and non-Muslims including even their own family 
members while some still maintained a level of interactions with and 
showed respect for non-Salafis. The goal of this analysis is to provide a 
rare insight into the role of formal and informal education in the radi-
calization process of Bosnia’s Salafis and inform the educational 
displacement and replacement model of radicalization presented in the next 
section. The study did not explore the globally networked power and 
money behind the Salafis’ radicalization effort in Bosnia, but the 
financial support of Salafi converts came up inadvertently. The Salafi 
mentees lacked the understanding of the external funding network 
behind the spread of Salafism. 
Beyond understanding a small segment of the Bosnian population 
that has endorsed Salafism, the larger study dissected how and why 
some Bosnians have moved toward greater religiosity following the 
genocide against Bosnian Muslims. As previously discussed, targeting of 
a group increases that group’s propensity toward religiosity and search 
for the alternative spaces of acceptance and belonging outside schools 
and classrooms. But, how precisely that shift occurs in Bosnia and what 
role education plays are the central questions of the larger study. 
5. Findings and analysis: the educational displacement and 
replacement model of radicalization 
The study sequences the Salafi radicalization in a new educational 
displacement and replacement model (Fig. 1) using the empirical data from 
the in-depth interviews with 20 Salafi converts. They recognize an 
inherent relationship between power, elites, corruption, and institutions 
and thus question the value and intent of the formal education. For 
them, formal education is no different than other mainstream in-
stitutions perpetuating status quo, compelling them to search for refor-
mation and transformation in alternative spaces, which is where 
Salafism resides. Salafism is the ideological bent within Islam that is 
ultraconservative and thus more susceptible to radicalization. 
All converts acknowledge a diminished role of educators, schools, 
and mosques, which they gradually replace with the informal religious 
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mentors who become their trusted teachers, friends, and respected 
ideological guides. Mosques as formal religious spaces lose relevance 
once an individual is drawn into the alternative Salafi learning spaces. 
The radicalization process (Fig. 1) therefore begins with the educational 
displacement from formal institutions where individuals first experience 
the lack of belonging, recognition, and engagement. This sense of 
displacement that alienates them from the classroom, their teachers, and 
peers early in life is magnified by either personal or referential griev-
ances. The educational displacement is nuanced and can affect even top 
performers in schools and universities, but one shared feature is a sense 
of exclusion, invisibility, and lack of belonging. The radicalizing re-
cruiters leverage educational displacement by offering to replace formal 
teachers and diminish the influence of schools. The informal mentors 
provide refuge (Fig. 1) and begin by deepening loyalty and trust with 
their mentees along with propagating their ideological position - in this 
case religious purity and morality - via social media platforms and in 
person. 
In a vacuum left by the formal education, the Salafi mentors provide 
continuing education for the marginalized through mentorship-based 
clinics, online programming, podcasts, and physical lectures. While 
mosques have some relevance as the initial meeting places, the radi-
calization process transpires in informal spaces. One Salafi declares: “the 
most important for me have been religious conferences where I meet 
those who studied Islam abroad, whose work and discipline are 
impressive. They provoke feelings in me” (ZI043). Salafi mentors deploy 
their rigid interpretation of Islam, veiled in secrecy, and through one-on- 
one relationships supported by curated content online (Fig. 1). In doing 
so, they are the gatekeepers to the unique and personalized radicaliza-
tion process. As ZI043 goes on to share, “We have no TV, only internet 
and phone so we can control [emphasis added] information that comes 
into our house. I do not read newspapers because of pictures and 
immorality.” 
With their intentional teaching, Salafi mentors are the locus of this 
educational displacement and replacement model of radicalization that be-
gins with the youths’ sense of displacement from the formal education 
(Fig. 1) – an educational void that the radicalizing mentors from the 
informal spaces readily fill. A Salafi woman says: “Educational in-
stitutions had no influence on me” (KO22). Her conversion into Salafism 
did not take place in a mosque, but at home when she married her 
husband and had a mentor “who instructed [her] on what to do, and on 
what is right.” 
When individuals feel educationally displaced relative to others, the 
disfranchised self-initiate search for the alternative source of empow-
erment and belonging. Those alternatives percolate through the 
informal educational spaces and are offered by mentors (Fig. 1) who 
further transition the vulnerable into the societal outskirts. The study 
finds some Muslims express frustration with the exclusion, inequity, and 
deprivation they had experienced while living in the West relative to the 
non-Muslim majorities in the Western European societies while others 
feel deprived as compared to the corrupt elites in their local environ-
ment even if those elites are predominantly Muslim. For instance, ZI043, 
a married father of three, returned from Germany “because the story of 
West, the story that media tells us is not true.” A young married Salafi 
woman living in Bosnia similarly recognizes: “Majority does not want to 
accept us, they do not want our social norms and behaviors (KO22).” 
These differing types of deprivations and grievances are not mutually 
exclusive. Instead, personal grievances are often combined with refer-
ential grievances (Fig. 1), where local Muslims connect their personal 
exclusion to the exclusion of Muslims globally. As KO22 points out: 
“There is injustice towards us Muslims, and I do not like to be made fun 
of for what I wear. Allah ordered me to wear niqab, not wear heels, not 
wear jewelry. I walk out and do not react to their ridiculing of me.” 
These grievances serve as a connective tissue that uniquely positions the 
aggrieved to feel educationally displaced. 
Either real or perceived, personal grievances are often collectivized 
under a narrative of victimhood. As earlier discussed, the Serb 
Fig. 1. Educational displacement and replacement radicalization model.  
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nationalists justified the genocide of Bosnian Muslims in 1990 s by 
fictionalizing stories of Muslims as feeding Serb children to animals in 
Sarajevo’s zoo (Zulic, 2018). For the radicalization purposes, it is 
irrelevant whether these victimhood narratives and associated griev-
ances have credence or not. What matters is the perception by the 
aggrieved. For instance, in the case of some interviewees, their experi-
ence of anti-Muslim racism, exclusion, and marginalization in the 
Western settings, whether real or perceived, has motivated them to turn 
to the radicalizing spaces. 
While many explore radicalization, not all radicalize. The Salafi 
model has 5 key defining controls aimed at securing its success: language 
control, information/knowledge control, trust control, relationship control, 
and guidance control (Fig. 2). These controls allow Salafi recruiters to 
construct and deploy exclusionary narratives to invalidate non-Salafi 
viewpoints. As others have shown, language can build social prejudice 
to solidify one’s own power and credibility (Quasthoff, 1989; Chilton, 
2004; Holly, 1989; Wodak, 1989). Through language control, Salafi 
mentors define beliefs, norms, and behaviors that are acceptable and 
moral. They also develop a narrative that controls who enters their 
mentees’ circles and who is to be trusted (trust control). One of the Salafi 
converts reveals, “I do not trust newspapers, only my mentors and 
religious sites I visit online” (KO23). 
Another argues, “It is more important who says it than what is said” 
(ZI043). Mentors curate content for the new converts, who learn how to 
navigate the approved sources and other go-to platforms which gives 
them control over knowledge creation and informal learning (knowl-
edge/information control). The interviewed Salafis feel other-ed by their 
negative portrayal in the mainstream media. Their mentors actively 
discredit the mainstream sources of information (knowledge/information 
control) and maintain the Salafi version of Islam as the only true Islam: 
for them, Salafism is “the only correct and valid [emphasis added] way to 
follow Islam” (Interviewee TZ003). Salafi mentors control information 
and knowledge that a new convert to Salafism is exposed to. 
With a mentor becoming a close confidant (guidance control) that 
builds a new paradigm for the mentee, the mentor also exerts power over 
relationships that are acceptable or not within that new world. Conse-
quently, the interactions between Salafis and non-Salafis infrequently 
occur, further limiting Salafis’ exposure to diverse viewpoints and at 
times even their interactions with family (relationship control). All 5 
controls (Fig. 2) ought to be maintained throughout the entire radical-
ization process to ensure its successful completion.  
a. A Ten-Step Pathway to Extremism Begins with Educational 
Displacement 
Education is a process of gaining a perspective on the world that has 
been historically formalized through the establishment of schools and 
systems of schools. As the first spaces where children learn about 
themselves and world around them, schools institutionally monopolize 
framing of the “truth regimes” (Foucault, 1975). These truth regimes 
inform paradigms, knowledge, and norms guiding human behaviors. 
While contemporary Salafis aspire to mirror Islam’s first followers in 
their values and behaviors, Salafis greatly depart from early Muslims 
during the Islam’s Golden Age when the scientific inquiry and critical 
thinking were deemed Allah’s directive (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2020a). The 
present day Salafis view religious knowledge as superior to other forms 
of knowledge while early Muslims interpreted Allah’s word as his in-
struction to reinforce belief via reason and vice versa (Sabic-El-Rayess, 
2020a). This positionality of the religious and scientific knowledge as 
equally valuable fueled early Muslims’ developments of algebra, as-
tronomy, optics, engineering, and poetry (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2020a). 
Today, Salafis wrongly argue that “first comes religion and then other 
education” and they would eliminate “mother nature, art, and music” 
from the curriculum (KO23). This perspective reflects the much later 
traditionalist current in Islam that favors the strict following of religion, 
but does not reflect the attitudes, practices, and beliefs of early Muslims 
(Sabic-El-Rayess, 2020a). 
Educational systems are hierarchical and preferential to standardi-
zation and distinct structure of power. Learning in formal institutions 
therefore lacks a personalized touch that Salafis provide via informal 
education. As ZI043 shares, “After one wild night, I met one man who 
advised me that night and brought me back to faith.” The dominant 
narratives in schools typically align with the elites’ perspectives in the 
societies, so what occurs in the classroom tends to mirror broader so-
cietal paradigms, preferences, dominance, and knowledge (Interviewee 
ZE15). In such context, educational displacement (Fig. 1) of the margin-
alized can occur. “In our schools nothing is learned that should be 
learned. To be honest, I finished only one year of high-school and 
dropped out” (KO23), which characterizes the sentiment of some 
interviewed Salafi converts. This educational displacement is the first step 
that opens the door for Salafi mentors to replace the formal schooling. 
It is not their commitment to Salafism that first draws the vulnerable 
in; it is first that the mainstream education system pushes them towards 
the alternatives within which the threads of the ultraconservative Sal-
afism reside. One Bosnian Salafi (ZE15) details: “I am my own education 
and educational institutions had no influence on me. I relied on mentors 
for learning rather than school.” A door to radicalization is first opened 
when educators and schools do not provide students with opportunities 
to engage in tough conversations and constructively address their 
grievances. Another Salafi (TZ 003) discusses factors affecting his 
grievances with formal education: 
“All teachers are not fair when examining students or transferring 
knowledge, and a lot can be done to improve that perhaps to make 
sure they are more collegial, more caring, to show more love for their 
job in the moment when they need to tackle complicated topics with us 
[emphasis added]. Of course, there are many failings particularly 
when it comes to cheating and corruption in education [emphasis 
added]”. 
Feeling unfairly treated, ignored, or being pushed out of the class-
room motivates students to turn to radical alternatives. After youths 
disengage in the classrooms, they seek to replace the mainstream edu-
cation with the alternatives. Schools become unimportant and informal 
education takes over because once “you enter [Salafism], you have to 
know the rules” (Interviewee SA38). Young people search for a sense of 
belonging and explore various options. A Salafi interviewee explains 
(TZ003) that he was unable to find answers to questions of purpose to his 
life in school, so: “I spent time learning about Jehovah’s Witnesses while 
I was a teen, then Bible, both Old and New Testament, but I found it all 
illogical to me.” 
Within the alternative space, the extremists’ recruiters actively offer, 
Fig. 2. Radicalization narrative control model.  
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in person or online, the educational replacement. A Salafi interviewee 
details how he left not only formal education but also a religious school 
he was attending for 12 years and instead joined online Salafi lectures 
for the past 5.5 years (KO23). For the educationally marginalized, these 
alternative spaces offer, as Foucault would argue, a pathway to chal-
lenge power in hope to capture some power. Whenever the conformity is 
undermined, an individual can become more susceptible to criminal and 
extremist behavior (Schils and Pauwels, 2014). But, it is an avenue to 
inclusion and meaningful life that at first these individuals hope to find. 
The educational displacement is exacerbated by the individual expe-
riencing either personal or referential grievances (Fig. 1). Some are 
economically deprived. A Salafi woman specifies that she is unable to 
find a job because she experiences discrimination for wearing niqab; her 
exclusion is further compounded by her feeling that the formal educa-
tion has ostracized her as a minority and adversely impacted opportu-
nities for her young sons (TZ001). Others view political elites and 
institutions as corrupt (SA38). If those grievances cannot be explored by 
critically engaging in schools, some students will look for answers 
outside schools. 
With the West’s ownership of the ideological narrative of democracy, 
multi-ethnicity, meritocracy, progress, modernity, and statehood, 
educationally displaced Muslims turn to the one ideological platform 
Muslims can both readily claim and easily access - Islam. Educationally 
displaced and marginalized Muslims on their pathway to radicalization 
often romanticize the Golden Age when the Islamic Caliphate was most 
prosperous and early Muslims emerged. While Islam then was defined 
by its openness to diverse knowledge and espousal of scientific inno-
vation (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2020a), the Salafi recruiters today position the 
narrative of scientific and educational progress and innovation as 
inherently Western or corrupt by the Western interests. This worldview 
disengages radicalizing youths from formal education and instead limits 
the most vulnerable youths to the radicalizing mentors who monopolize 
the informal learning spaces. “They approached me with nice things… 
Mentors are most influential for me” (KO23). 
Mentors (Fig. 1) are seen as learned men who are devout Muslims 
and knowledgeable about the Qur’an, often educated in the Middle East. 
A college-educated, unemployed Salafi shared that he had no formal 
education on Islam, but benefited from his mentors who “studied in 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt” (Interviewee TZ003). This reiterates the 
salience of controlling the knowledge, but also the relevance of the trust 
control through which the formal education is delegitimized in lieu of 
knowledge coming from the Salafi mentors educated at the source. In-
terviewees never mentioned that these mentors were employed by an 
institution or compensated for their work. But, mentors were deemed to 
be of the highest status as the sole, trusted, and personable guides to true 
knowledge (guidance control). Al-Ghazali who propagated a tradition-
alist perspective in Islam similarly argued in the 12th century (Günther, 
2006): teachers in Islam are expected to teach without compensation 
and solely for the benefit of spreading Islam. 
Mentorship is indispensable to radicalizing the educationally dis-
placed (Fig. 1) and through relationship control gradually replaces 
teaching and learning in the mainstream education. One of the in-
terviewees (SA38) acknowledged he searched for the alternatives to the 
formal schooling and first endorsed other branches of Islam until he 
heard a lecture by a well-known Bosnian Salafi influencer, Dr. Safet 
Kuduzovic. Mentors fill the vacuum left by the formal education systems 
with a caring and inclusive yet rigid and skewed interpretation of Islam 
to galvanize the lost and marginalized. They evoke the quixotic mem-
ories of the Islamic caliphate during Islam’s Golden Age. 
In lieu of formal education, the mentor’s guidance control over 
educationally displaced is necessity on the path towards radicalization. 
The new era of digital access brings a challenge to the rigid and static 
educational systems (Sabic-El-Rayess and Joshi, 2022): technology has 
created competing virtual spaces of learning with the Salafi mentors 
offering podcasts and video lectures via social media. A Salafi convert 
explains: “I have wide network of Facebook friends who publish 
information I am interested in…We only read what we need to self--
educate.” Twitter alone accounts for about 40% of all extremist traffic 
online (Frampton et al., 2017). The Salafi mentors, often referred to by 
the Salafi converts as “friends”, help them navigate the online content 
(information/knowledge control). In addition to learning from mentors, “I 
also learned a lot about Salafism through books, catalogues, lectures, 
and Internet” (KO23). The informal lectures and community gatherings 
are venues where radicalization is solidified (SA38). With the helping 
hand of their mentors, individuals are guided through the online content 
that is selective and curated (Fig. 1) to deepen their educational 
replacement. 
Some Salafi mentors garner large social media followings and stream 
their lectures to large groups in Bosnia: “I explored Sufism before 
settling on Salafism after listening to a lecture by Safet Kuduzovic [a 
charismatic Salafi preacher]” (SA38). Occasionally, to further one’s 
marginalization, these mentors contrast Islam with all that is perceived 
as Western, including formalized education. An interviewee (KO023) 
purports teaching democracy is problematic because it suggests that 
“power belongs to people when power belongs only to Allah.” 
Under the direction of a mentor, new converts are eventually guided 
(guidance control) through a complete religious transformation (Fig. 1) 
where “You have to disown all unbelievers” (KO23), which for this 
radicalizing Salafi includes both other Muslims and non-Muslims. All 
interviewed Salafis believe that their conversion to Salafism was their 
turn towards morality and ethical behavior: “Islam teaches ethical 
behavior so nothing bad can be learned from Islam. Islam has expanded 
because of its beauty not its sword.” (SA38). 
The transformative learning theory (Mezirow, 1997) explains how 
an event or grievance in one’s life can trigger transformative learning, a 
process where an affected individual deconstructs their old self and 
constructs a new self to make sense of the world. As some convert into 
Salafism, they self-reflect and religiously transform (Fig. 1). Many were 
not observant Muslims in the past: “Before the war [in Bosnia], I drank 
too much and I lied sometimes, but after the war I turned to faith…It was 
only during the war in 1992 that I turned to religion more, slowly, when 
they were killing us…now religion is my life” (ZE15). Others note that 
their experience of religious transformation was about achieving inter-
nal sense of satisfaction, peace, and belonging that nothing else could 
provide: 
“A person seeks something in life and cannot understand what that is, 
it pressures you in the chest to seek some satisfaction and at times it 
is the pleasure of money, or cars, not to even speak of women, but 
even when you get all of that you are still unhappy until you meet 
your faith, concretely Islam…until the person enters for the first time 
into a mosque, prays for the first time and hears the first prayer or the 
words of imam and recognizes how his heart softens. That is what 
attracts a person, one feels the strength of something beautiful, even 
if he doesn’t know exactly how it shapes him (TZ004).” 
As they religiously transform, the new Salafi converts begin to build 
a sense of elitism even if only within the marginalized circles (Fig. 1). 
Their new moral framework gives them a feeling of belonging to the 
marginalized elite. They are empowered for the first time. A Salafi woman 
(TZ001) shares: 
“We are treated differently because we behave differently. We have 
our own code of behavior. Different way of life. Most people today 
live without rules and we do not. It is Allah’s order to be obedient, 
dress and behave accordingly. We cover not to be attacked, but to 
differentiate ourselves from others.” 
This newfound identity yields a feeling of superiority, higher status, 
and self-acceptance relative to non-believers. Another Salafi (TZ003) 
confides: 
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“There is a distance between a person who takes on these moral 
values and begins to compare himself to others. I see a chasm where 
others cheat, behave poorly, and do not maintain moral behavior, 
not even close to what Islam prescribes. On occasion, I look up to 
others I envy for their nice behavior. So there is a big chasm between 
what I find acceptable as traits, norms, and behaviors and what I see 
in my immediate surroundings.” 
Most converts say that even if they thought they were Muslim before, 
they actually never were until they converted into Salafism. Though 
they do not label themselves as Salafis, but true Muslims. 
The next step that is essential to one’s complete radicalization is self- 
isolation that at times means exclusion of family and friends (Fig. 1) if 
they could jeopardize one’s exclusive relationship with the radicalizing 
circle of friends and mentors. A number of interviewed Salafis noted that 
their circles of family and friends narrowed as they became more reli-
gious. If this exclusivity is maintained, self-isolation and self- 
marginalization deepen (Sabic-El-Rayess and Marsick, 2021). They 
become deliberate acts. Consequently, the radicalization is successfully 
achieved. Once fully radicalized, the individual is more likely to explore 
terrorism. 
6. Conclusion 
This nuanced analysis introduced a novel educational displacement 
and replacement model of radicalization. Educational displacement occurs 
in a larger societal context when individuals encounter prevailing so-
cietal narratives in educational system about themselves and society 
around them, which for some can be marginalizing and trigger feelings 
of exclusion, invisibility, and underrepresentation in the mainstream 
curriculum and narrative in education. Educational displacement occurs 
in classrooms and ultimately, for some, initiates the quest for alternative 
spaces of belonging and empowerment, within which the radicalization 
threads often reside. These encounters with exclusion and othering 
awaken grievances and frustrations that aid radicalization. At the core of 
this radicalization model is an informal teacher and a mentor who 
guides the vulnerable individuals through the multi-step radicalization 
process. While the educational displacement and replacement model of 
radicalization was developed based on the primary data collected within 
the Salafi community in the post-war Bosnia, the model provides a 
starting point for further study of educational displacement and radicali-
zation elsewhere. 
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